This paper explores the broad questions on China's presence in Africa from the perspectives on South-South relations. More generally, China has a diffuse and growing presence in Africa through trade relations, as the importation of various consumer goods is highly visible in most African capital cities, and numerous smaller towns. The racial problem is compounded by the prevalence of a sinophobic media in which a racial hierarchy constructs the China below whites, albeit with blacks being relegated to the bottom. Yet there are empirically observable racist tendencies amongst the Chinese settlers towards Africans, although this is often overstated. China has become influential in Africa at the level of trade, investments and geo-political relations, but it is far from being a hegemonic recolonizer. Moreover, Africa is increasingly militarized, but China is not substantially engaged at this level. The paper concludes by suggest that much more research is necessary in the future in terms of understanding South-South international relations, so that many more people learn more about countries in the Global South and their complex set of interactions. This requires various African intellectual networks to re-visit the Bandung spirit and reconstruct the idea of non-alignment and solidarity.
Introduction
This paper is based on an earlier article that provides a broad conceptual framework on the evolution of imperialism and the scramble for African resources (Moyo, Yeros, and Jha 2012) . There is an increasing number of thematic and country studies that have been undertaken on China's presence in Africa today, and over the last few years more detailed empirical studies provide us a with clearer picture of China's presence in various African countries. This paper explores the broad questions on China's presence in Africa.
In examining China's presence in Africa, the continent is often viewed as one big country or region, despite the fact that the continent has a variegated history and contemporary political economy. Indeed, the Sub-Saharan African countries have distinctly diverse political, demographic, economic and resource endowments of interest to a variety of foreign investors, of which China is but one source. Whereas most of the continent comprises largely agrarian societies, some of the countries are highly dependent on the export of natural resources, minerals, and oil, and others are relatively more industrialized. Thus, the continent experienced varied forms and degrees of capitalist penetration and transformation (Amin 1972) . For instance, the history of settler-colonial settlement in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Kenya introduced specific cultural, social and economic relations that have significantly shaped the nature of their external relations. The fact that the history of land alienation in the settler-colonies dated back to the 19th century means that in the present day scramble for African land and natural resource extraction these countries are more of a bridgehead for foreign investment into Africa than a source of new land acquisitions. Indeed, the geopolitical and security issues facing individual African countries also varies substantially, as this has been shaped by the historic relations with external powers in the context of the Cold War.
Therefore, the presence of China in Africa today is broadly differentiated according to China's varied historical reflections with different African countries in terms of trade, investment and security concerns. Indeed, China has a diverse historical relationship to various African countries, and has been more visible in some countries than others. Its presence in Africa gained prominence through its support to liberation movements in Southern Africa from 1960s and the construction of the Tazara railway in the 1970s. However, China's presence in Africa today is more significant in those countries with extensive energy resources, which it increasingly extracts. More generally, China has a diffuse and growing presence in Africa through trade relations, as the importation of various consumer goods is highly visible in most African capital cities, and numerous smaller towns.
Perspectives on China's presence in Africa
In general, the literature suggests that there are three different types of interrelated approaches through which China's presence in Africa can be assessed. The first perspective views China as a contemporary independent and hegemonic force that is (re)colonizing Africa. The second perspective views China's presence in Africa as a benign aspect of a globalization process in which the diversification of markets and emergent powers provides room for manoeuver for African states, which have for long been marginalized by Eurocentric domination. A third perspective, linked to the first two views is that China is one element of a broader process of primitive accumulation on a world scale in the context of a deepening crisis of capitalism. A variant of this perspective views China as a "sub-imperial" force leading the Scramble for African resources only as a tributary component of Euro-American hegemony.
The recolonization thesis argues that Africa is being "colonized" by China as the new dominant force in the globalized economy, and that it seeks to extract natural resources for its autonomous growth with limited re-investment into the continent's development. By and large, the China recolonization thesis assumes that there is a dominance of Chinese capital in Africa and that the Chinese state now has greater influence on African states. However, the empirical evidence on the situation on the ground, shows that China's increased presence in Africa is only relatively high in recent times and, when compared with the overall presence of EuroAmerican-based capital in Africa, it is far from being dominant.
The recolonization thesis is mainly posited by various liberal Western scholars and is widely floated in the mainstream media, as well as by some African scholars, using the epitaph of the destructive dragon. However, the recolonization perspective also has some degree of popular resonance, in so far as public opinion in the African street is increasingly concerned by the increased presence of competing new traders and labor largely from China.
However, the fact that the African state has been politically independent for over 50 years within the evolving world system of states, albeit in the context of a center-periphery hierarchy, dominated by the West, raises numerous questions about the concept and feasibility of re-colonization by China per se. Indeed, the juridical and security framework of the African continents, open as it is to an external capture of its resources, entails different forms and mechanisms of resource control from those possible a century ago and before. The China recolonization thesis is poorly conceptualized in so far as it does not differentiate the present resource capture process from the classical formal colonially inspired scramble for Africa through the partition shaped by the 1844 Berlin Treaty. That scramble was related to a European partitioning of Africa within a specific world economic and geopolitical context that involved a specific military situation in defense of a particular form of imperialism and world capitalist system.
The colonial relationship that emerged entailed full-scale nation subjugation, which involved military conquest and control of African economies through a colonial mode of political rule. The China recolonization thesis is based on superficial perceptions of China's presumed control of the Africanist political economy, despite the reconfigured character of imperialism under monopoly finance capital.
Moreover, since the emergence of independent African nation states in the 1960s, at least in terms of formal political power and the mode of rule, the colonial division of economic interests in Africa, among Western sources of capital has been changing, leading to a weaker coordination of the current drive to capture African resources compared with the 19th century scramble. That process of colonization entailed sharing the spoils and shaking the past mercantile regimes, and direct military conquest of African nations. Thus, many of the China-Africa studies restrict themselves to a very narrow view of China's presence in a given sector (be it the oil, energy, or construction), or focus only on the new sources of resource control, such as Chinese or Indian investments. However, when the cumulative tally of the overall foreign investments in most African countries is examined, the picture shows a more broadly based international scramble for the control of African resources.
The second perspective values the new Chinese presence in Africa as a critical resource that has been, or can be, leveraged by African states against foreign capital in general. This has created what Samir Amin calls "room for manoeuvre," in so far as China's investments have created space for African governments' decision making on long-term development (Amin 2006) . This process evolving mechanism of international relations is considered to have revived the scope for the "ping pong diplomacy" that characterized the Cold War era.
Of particular concern is the space created to negotiate the lending conditionalities of the IFIs (e.g. IMF, World Bank; AfDB, and bi-lateral donors), in relation to access to new forms of finance for Africa from China and other "emerging powers." To a certain extent, this perspective has been advanced by nationalists and left intellectuals, including a few African governments, who welcomed the increased presence of China in the financing of various sectors such as infrastructure, irrigation, and so forth. Indeed, such sectors had been financed by the IFI during the 1950s and 1960s, only for them to be abandoned from the 1980s as structural adjustment programs emerged. The revival of such funding to Africa is considered critical to its autonomous development agenda, raising the idea of a new "Beijing Consensus" from the 2000s.
Room for manoeuver tends to be seen in a positive light, not only in the context of the new amounts and forms of financing available, but also in terms of the prospect for reforming the UN and international financial institutions. Indeed, the role of China at the level of various UN organizations has been visible, given that it also provided geopolitical cover to some countries that have been under pressure from certain Western nations pursuing a regime change agenda (e.g. Zimbabwe, Sudan, and so on). The involvement of China in financing international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, is also seen as portending the new BRICS infrastructure, and a development bank led by China is considered to be a promising new source of African development finance.
These two approaches to the analysis of China's presence in Africa feed into and are related to a third perspective which, contrary to a simplistic recolonization thesis addresses the question in terms of the world systems approach. In this case, Africa and the Global South are seen as generally facing a classical imperialist scramble for markets, land, minerals and natural resources (including water and forests) as part of a wider process of continuous primitive accumulation, in the context of recent crises of capitalism (since 2001). The current scramble is classical in so far as it involves the export of surplus capital of transnationals, following recent world economic crises relating to the collapse of profits, as well as the increasing militarization of Africa's relations with the West (Moyo, Yeros and Jha 2012; Moyo, Jha, and Yeros 2013) .
Indeed, China's presence on the continent has increased since 2001, as its economy grew sharply and its demand for raw materials increased. The key symptoms of the crisis of capitalism on a global scale, entailed increased insecurity over energy resources, and the rising demand for energy and raw materials, following the Middle East oil crisis that escalated from January 2000. The energy and food crises that followed, between 2002 and 2008, and the financial crises that peaked around 2008, reflected a persistent crisis related to the falling rate of profits. All of these processed together created conditions for the increased export of capital not only to Africa, but to different parts of the Global South. However, Africa has become a prime destination of the current scramble as it is wrongly perceived to be an uncaptured frontier, in which land, water, natural resources and minerals are presumed to be largely underutilized.
Thus, the current scramble for Africa involves, on the one hand transnational capital, located in diverse nation-states and on the other hand the active involvement of nation-states through various arms of their governments and civil society organizations. The diverse states involved are represented by state capital in the form of SOEs and private firms supported by the states, and all such firms are provided with diplomatic cover, and supported through the increased use of soft state power. Although external military force has been used in some African countries to secure control over resources, China has not done so. However, China has increased the export of arms to a few African countries, most of which are under NATO sanctions (e.g. Zimbabwe and Sudan).
Thus, beyond the questions surrounding the militarization of the current scramble for Africa, the international interests in African resources and the geopolitical and world economic context have changed considerably. For instance, over the last 30 years a variety of semi-peripheral (semi-industrializing) countries have emerged, and these too are involved in increased export of capital to the Global South during the crisis. Such countries seek to directly engage new markets for their manufactures in Africa, and they seek independent access to various mineral and energy resources for their own industrialization projects, within the context of the center-periphery framework of the international political economy.
Thus, there has been an expansion of the number of countries within Asia, and the Middle East, Turkey and Brazil that seek to invest in Africa, with the number of countries that have the capacity (albeit at different scales) to get involved in the scramble for Africa having grown. In fact, investments from the Gulf region and various Asian countries (besides China) have grown, leading to an important shift in the world economic context. The diverse inter-state relations that have emerged are too complex to fit a straightforward re-colonization (and even sub-imperialism) process.
Yet, in discussing the idea of the scramble for Africa, much more is said about China in Africa than about India, Brazil, Turkey, the Gulf and other emerging countries or "semi-peripheries," even if the members of the original Bandung (non-aligned) movement are under consideration, and the focus is on China with less interest in the increasing presence of Singapore, Malaysia, and so forth in Africa. There are many more actors involved who constitute this new idea of south-south cooperation, with different styles and interests at stake. The specific presence of China in the African economies and land vis-à-vis other external actors is examined next.
China's presence in the African economy
The presence of China in the African economy varies across different sectors and among the countries. Moreover, China's increasing presence in Africa has to be understood in terms of its more rapid growth from the late 1990s and the increase of "openness" of African economies since their liberalization in the 1980s. From 1990, the structural adjustment programs promoted increased liberalization of trade and a steady rise in the privatization of state-owned enterprises, including mines in countries such as Zambia. During the 1990s, liberalization created a space for capital from both the West and China. In the context of the African de-industrialization that escalated from the late 1980s, the West played a more dominant role in the export of consumer goods to Africa. However, during the 2000s, Chinese consumer exports have grown, and in some sectors (e.g. textiles, shoes) they have become the dominant import.
Although the overall trade between Africa and China has grown, cumulatively speaking, the combined Euro-American trade and investments still dominate the African business scene. However, in some countries, especially in the oil-rich African countries, new Chinese investments in oil and infrastructure have begun to shift the balance in favor of China and its presence has substantial influence in its political economy (e.g. Angola) influence (Cheru and Obi 2010 ). Yet by and large, in most of the countries, Euro-American capital is the dominant player, and it influences economic policy substantially.
Nonetheless, new Chinese small-and medium-scale commercial (SMEs) enterprises have substantially increased their presence in Africa, and although they may be outnumbered by African SMEs, their dominance of imports is a phenomenon that has become highly visible. For most African countries, the adopted structural adjustment policies that opened up the economies of these countries (trade, capital markets, and so on) and led to de-industrialization as an import substitution activity, generates negative perceptions of the Chinese presence. However, given also that China has become the global manufacturer, and that its goods "compete" better globally, it is not surprising that African retail markets are pretty dominated by Chinese goods and, to a lesser extent, by South African goods, given that the latter's supermarkets have become dominant in formal commerce.
Nonetheless, in terms of investments in Africa's broader minerals, agricultural and construction sectors, foreign investments continue to be dominated by transnational corporations (TNCs) based in the West. These TNCs alongside Chinese firms have stepped up their scramble for African Resources during the 2000s. Chinese mining capital is increasing its presence across a range of commodities. For instance, in Zimbabwe, Chinese interests in mining include chrome, diamonds and platinum. Nonetheless, South African, American and British companies remain the dominant investor in these minerals within Southern Africa. China is a significant investor in Zambian copper alongside Western and Chilean investors. However, in countries such as Angola and Nigeria, the dominant foreign investors in mining are from the West.
One arena in which China has become a dominant player across Africa is in the construction of new infrastructures such as the rehabilitation of new roads, railways and other infrastructure. Over the past ten years, there has been substantial financing of major projects from China in countries such as Angola. Efforts to do the same in the DRC led to the DRC government landing in a confrontation with IFIs, such that key infrastructure projects were delayed. Thus, the physical presence of China in the construction, which often involves importing Chinese labor, is very significant in economic and political terms, highlighting perceptions of its dominance.
Consequently, the new investment deals and financing conditions offered by China to African countries, are considered to pose a threat to the established Western lending model, including that from the IFIs. As already mooted, Chinese investments have also brought about new forms of lending for broader infrastructure development. This Chinese dominance and influence has, however, been accompanied by an important critique (which I believe is valid), which suggests that there is a substantial amount of corruption involved in some of the deals made between China and African elites, who get commissions, particularly for undesirable extractive Chinese investments. The Chinese and Indian TNCs and states are also alleged to ignore "good governance" norms.
Indeed, much of the debate about the recolonization of Africa tends to be inter-mingled with perceptions about the corruption involving Chinese firms, which get concessions to mine and develop infrastructure at sub-economic or over-valued prices vis-à-vis the presumed lack of corruption among TNC's from the west. However, it cannot be argued that Western TNCs are not equally, if not more, corrupt. For instance, recent reports suggest that there has been a significant rise of illicit financial flows from Africa (AU/ECA 2014; GFI and AfDB 2013). Unaccounted resources leaving Africa are tied to transnational corporations from both the West, and the East.
Furthermore, a more pertinent question to be raised with regard to whether Chinese capital undermines good governance in Africa, is whether good governance principles are consistently and uniformly applied to all African countries by the Western nations that allege that China ignores mis-governance and human rights transgressions. Moreover, the governance conflicts that have emerged after Western military interventions in countries such as Libya indicate that the good governance mantra is not only based on double standards depending on the interests of the West, but that it creates new conflicts and poor governance.
Nonetheless, a number of studies that compare Western and Chinese investments in Africa have shown that wages paid by the Chinese investors are lower than those paid by the Western Investors, and that the working conditions imposed are extremely onerous. There are also real questions that have been raised about the racist character of the Chinese entrepreneurs' treatment of labor in Africa. Indeed, there have been some significant albeit scattered conflicts that have arisen over poor wages and work conditions. Yet the weak regulations of African labor in general have been a critical source of such transgressions by foreign capital.
Scramble for African land
The recent increase in the acquisition of largescale landholding by foreign entities is another area in which China's presence in Africa is believed to have grown. However, when we examine the data relating to land grabbing in Africa (see Table 1 ) China is not the major land grabber. China and India, plus all the other semi-peripheries (e.g. Turkey, the Gulf), have attempted to acquire less than 40% of the grabbed land. Instead, numerous multinational companies from America, Europe and Scandinavia, (which are relatively new in the foreign resource grab game) are the dominant players involved in the land grab. Whereas global economic conditions have created greater scope for foreign firms to export capital and for African governments to negotiate with a wider range of bidders and concessioners compared with the colonial era, China does not dominate the land grabbing in most African countries, despite its extensive foreign reserves. For instance, in Ethiopia, India is the dominant grabber of land, the dominant new actor. In North and South Sudan, it is the transnationals that are dominant players. In Tanzania, European countries are dominant.
Furthermore, the dynamics of the scramble for African resources has become much more complicated than often recognized. For instance, a couple of years ago, the media reported that the US government was striking agreements with India to pursue some investments in Africa on agricultural transformation. There is also Japan for instance, which has teamed up with Brazil in one of the biggest land grabs in Africa (i.e. in Northern Mozambique). Resolving Africa's agrarian question is thus one of the biggest issues of the day, and it underlies the poverty and hunger that pervades the continent, but the alienation of African land does not offer any real opportunity for addressing these problems.
However, although land grabbing has become increasingly problematic, rather than being a pan-Africa phenomenon, it has been focused around nine African countries. The major foreign actors (British, Chinese, America, Europe, Gulf) all have a presence in these countries, including Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Sudan, Mali and so forth. The displacement of people from land and the incipient commodification of land has indeed become a major problem. Primitive accumulation, through a process of extraeconomic compulsion, has forced large segments of African lands into global markets, and deepens wage-labor relations in some of these localities.
Nonetheless, there is substantial resistance to land grabbing in a number of the countries, even where land grabbing has been high. In the past 15 years, a number of attempts have been reversed because of internal resistance of different sorts in countries such as Tanzania and Madagascar. In Ethiopia, there is more land listed for grabbing than has actually been grabbed due to actual struggles against the grab. Resistances in Africa takes various forms, including through the customary land tenure system, which despite its exclusions of those who do not belong to local communities, is an important institution in the defense of foreign land grab. This is why the economic liberalization agenda from the 1980s sought unsuccessfully to convert customary land tenures into leasehold, tradeable, marketable lands. Thus, some of the African states, where land grabbing is common have used the powers of "eminent domain" to force the alienation of land to foreign investors.
Geopolitics and military control in support of the scramble
China's presence in Africa has also grown substantially in terms of broader international relations, as well as in the evolution of Africa's security architecture, despite its limited role in military cooperation. Although China's geopolitical influence in Africa has grown, this kind of relationship has not yet taken center stage. Yet there are significant cases in which China has played an influential geopolitical role in balancing and mediating external relations. For example, where regime change processes led by Western nations have been on the cards, such as in Sudan and Zimbabwe, China has provided critical political cover to prevent excessive foreign interventions, including of a military nature. Relatedly, a few countries have gone as far as pronouncing a 'Look East' policy as a way of re-balancing political relations with the West. In particular, China's support for certain resolutions at the UN Security Council has not only provided political cover, but promoted South-South solidarity on critical geopolitical question, albeit with some contradictions.
Indeed, South Africa has played a critical role in providing political cover to Zimbabwe against the regime change from the West, the sanctions, and even an attempt at military intervention, in concurrence with China's support for the same. Both South Africa and China offered their support against excessive intervention in Zimbabwe at the UN Security Council, while providing limited financial support to revive the economy. This occurred however in the Southern Africa context in which the SADC mutual defense pact is one of the few defense pacts among Africa's regional cooperation structures. The defense pact was signed after the Great African War, the war in Congo, DRC, where countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia supported an American-sponsored invasion by US troops of Rwanda and Uganda. This highlights the importance of understanding the militarization of Africa's external relations.
The current scramble for Africa has nonetheless entailed an increased militarization of Africa's relations with the West. In this vein, we have what we see as an incipient reshaping of the international architecture within Africa's military relations, with the West expanding attempts by the United States of America to establish an African Command in Africa -attempts that have been ongoing from the mid-1990s, but escalated around 2005. A new and greater presence of US military activity in the different regions of Africa is observable. The competition for the control of and influence over the exploitation of African energy resources is closely linked to the short and longer term extension of the NATO security architecture within the Global South.
The current militarization of Africa's external relations is part of a broader re-engineering of the now defunct Cold War security architecture. Historically, countries such as South Africa, Egypt, the DRC and Kenya have been critical pillars of the NATO security architecture and strategy, under the leadership of the USA through the European-based command. Yet various Southern African countries had, until 1980, been Cold War theater of armed confrontations, with the Soviet Union and China supporting the armed liberation struggles of Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Indeed the Soviet Union, not China, had a greater military presence in Africa up to 1980.
Once RSA became independent, the southern Africa region was seen as increasingly unstable. Majority rule or democracy in South Africa was considered to have undermined the Western security regime that had been protected by settler-colonial rule, with the new South African political relations being considered less dependable than those of Apartheid South Africa.
Added to this, the land reform and its confrontation with the European settler community in Zimbabwe was, in the view of the West, considered a source of "political instability" that undermined the pre-existing security arrangements. Furthermore, another one of the security pillars of the Southern Africa region was shaken by the rebellions that overthrew Mobuto and created the DRC (under Kabila). Those countries that defended the DRC (Zimbabwe and Angola for example) against the Western backed war led by Rwanda and Uganda, became a key thorn for the USA, which has sought to reconstruct its security regime in Central Africa. Moreover, some of these countries are among those African countries that have received unique support from China, including of loans and investments, political backing at UN fora, and military supplies.
This military dimension of the scramble for African resources also underlay the war in the Ivory Coast more than 15 years ago, as well as Libya later on. In the Ivory Coast, one perspective suggests that military intervention by France reflects a contest between French [and] American capital in the established cocoa industry, in relation to the intentions of the nationalist government of former President Gbagbo to open the industry to locals and wider foreign interests. Moreover, a new rivalry emerged between Western oil firms and Chinese firms that sought oil concessions. In the Ivory Coast, the UN system was found to favor one of the political parties in their conflict over whether the election procedures were fairly followed, and the French military intervention was partly rooted in this, tilting rivalry in favor of one against the other.
In the same vein, Ghana was also caught up in a scramble for oil concessions between Chinese and American interests, such that American political interventions were used to disable the provisions of some oil concessions to China. Similarly, in Sudan, the presence of not only the Chinese, but also Russian capital and capital from the West, has created a rivalry over energy resources that has entrenched the militarization of the political conflict there. The militarization of the scramble for African resources is also obvious in the case of Libya. Whereas Zimbabwe is a unique case in that it does not have the most prized energy resources, it has a range of high value minerals required by China and the West (e.g. platinum, gold, chrome, uranium, coal, gas, diamonds, and so on). Given Zimbabwe's nationalization of land, natural resources and minerals since 2000 and the concession of some of these to China, Russia and Zimbabwean state enterprises, and a bellicose anti-Western stance, the country has continued to be a target of Western sanctions albeit in the name of human rights transgressions.
China's presence in Africa is also increasingly highlighted through various instruments of projecting soft power, including aid and cultural interactions. Thus, official cultural activities such as language training and higher education for Africans provided in China have been on the rise. Nonetheless, in spite of this kind of cultural exchange, many Africans note that there a persistent racial tension between the Chinese and Africans on the continent. There are some kinds of socio-economic enclaves dominated by Chinese communities in many countries, and there is limited integration. This racial problem is, however, compounded by the prevalence of a sinophobic media in which a racial hierarchy constructs the Chinese below whites, albeit with blacks being relegated to the bottom. Yet there are empirically observable racist tendencies amongst the Chinese settlers towards Africans, although this is often overstated.
Conclusions
To conclude, how should we think about the future? China has become influential in Africa at the level of trade, investments and geo-political relations, but it is far from being a hegemonic recolonizer. Moreover, Africa is increasingly militarized, but China is not substantially engaged at this level. China has, however, not tilted the space for African sovereign autonomy.
Issa Shivji has proposed that African countries should rethink and re-engage the idea of non-alignment in the new framework of the contemporary global context (Shivji 2003) . That is, each country should examine the impact of so-called Western and SouthSouth cooperation and investments in terms of new principles of non-alignment based upon rethinking the Bandung spirit. A reconceptualization of non-alignment means that most African countries that are still subordinated to the pressures of the IFI institutions and, aid and debt from the West, which have limited the countries' sovereign autonomy, should develop new forms of solidarity and cooperation that strengthen their resistance. Thus, Africa has to re-define its international engagements with the Global South, including with China.
A key question regarding the decolonization of perspectives on Africa's global integration and South-South relations, is the absence of a truly pan-African perspective on the continent's future. An intellectual liberation struggle is a critical part of any South-South movement in order to debunk certain ways of thinking among the disciplines (such as anthropology in particular, history, and the dominant social science, the paradigms) to reverse the particularist approach to conceptualizing Africa (e.g. neo-patrimonialism). Interestingly, when we think about the long-term view, in which Chinese scholars conceptualize their revolutions, and what forms of transformation are possible, a large degree of intellectual autonomy and leadership from Africa is still required. Much more research is necessary in the future in terms of understanding South-South international relations, so that many more people learn more about countries in the Global South and their complex set of interactions. This requires various African intellectual networks (including CODESRIA, AIAS, and so on) re-visiting the Bandung spirit and reconstructing the idea of non-alignment and solidarity.
